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BIG DATA IN SMALL HANDS
Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger*
“Big data” can be defined as a problem-solving philosophy that leverages
massive datasets and algorithmic analysis to extract “hidden information and
surprising correlations.”1 Not only does big data pose a threat to traditional
notions of privacy, but it also compromises socially shared information. This
point remains underappreciated because our so-called public disclosures are not
nearly as public as courts and policymakers have argued—at least, not yet. That
is subject to change once big data becomes user friendly.
Most social disclosures and details of our everyday lives are meant to be
known only to a select group of people.2 Until now, technological constraints
have favored that norm, limiting the circle of communication by imposing
transaction costs—which can range from effort to money—onto prying eyes.
Unfortunately, big data threatens to erode these structural protections, and the
common law, which is the traditional legal regime for helping individuals seek
redress for privacy harms, has some catching up to do.3

* Woodrow Hartzog is Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford
University; Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Evan Selinger is Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology; Fellow, Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology.
1. Ira Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA
PRIVACY L. 65, 74 (2013). The term “big data” has no broadly accepted definition and has
been defined many different ways. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER,
BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6
(2013) (“There is no rigorous definition of big data . . . . One way to think about the issue
today . . . is this: big data refers to things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a
smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 919 (2005).
3. See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 19-20 (2007); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1827 (2010); Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of
the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989,
1057 (1995); Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
357, 383 (2011); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prossers Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (2010); Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60
SMU L. REV. 1605 (2007).
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To make our case that the legal community is under-theorizing the effect
big data will have on an individual’s socialization and day-to-day activities, we
will proceed in four steps.4 First, we explain why big data presents a bigger
threat to social relationships than privacy advocates acknowledge, and construct a vivid hypothetical case that illustrates how democratized big data can
turn seemingly harmless disclosures into potent privacy problems. Second, we
argue that the harm democratized big data can inflict is exacerbated by decreasing privacy protections of a special kind—ever-diminishing “obscurity.” Third,
we show how central common law concepts might be threatened by eroding
obscurity and the resulting difficulty individuals have gauging whether social
disclosures in a big data context will sow the seeds of forthcoming injury.
Finally, we suggest that one way to stop big data from causing big, unredressed
privacy problems is to update the common law with obscurity-sensitive
considerations.
I.

BIG, SOCIAL DATA

For good reason, the threat big data poses to social interaction has not been
given its due. Privacy debates have primarily focused on the scale of big data
and concentrations of power—what big corporations and big governments can
do with large amounts of finely analyzed information. There are legitimate and
pressing concerns here, which is why scholars and policymakers focus on Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), deidentification techniques, sectoral
legislation protecting particular datasets, and regulatory efforts to improve data
security and safe international data transfers.5
4. A notable exception is Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove’s Reworking Information Privacy Law: A Memorandum Regarding Future ALI Projects About
Information Privacy Law (Aug. 2012), http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/images/centers
/judicialstudies/Reworking_Info_Privacy_Law.pdf. They write:
People also expect “privacy by obscurity,” that is, the ability to blend into a crowd or find
other ways to be anonymous by default. This condition is rapidly disappearing, however,
with new technologies that can capture images and audio nearly everywhere. As an example,
facial recognition technology is constantly improving. Already, Facebook and Apple use
technologies that permit the automatic tagging of photographs. One day devices, such as
Google Glasses, may permit the identification of passing pedestrians on the street. In short, if
the privacy torts are to be rethought, more guidance must be provided as to the underlying
concept of privacy.

Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
5. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1776 (2010) (“Easy reidentification represents a sea change not only in technology but in our understanding of privacy.”); Rubinstein, supra note 1, at 74; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 256-57 (2013);
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63
(2012); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117
(2013); danah boyd, Address at the WWW2010 Conference: “Privacy and Publicity in the
Context of Big Data” (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/2010
/WWW2010.html. But see Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2011).
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This trajectory fails to address the full scope of big data as a disruptive
force in nearly every sector of the patchwork approach to privacy protection in
the United States. Individuals eventually will be able to harness big datasets,
tools, and techniques to expand dramatically the number and magnitude of
privacy harms to themselves and others, perhaps without even realizing it.6
This is problematic in an age when so many aspects of our social relationships
with others are turned into data.
Consider web-scraping companies that dig up old mugshots and showcase
them online, hoping embarrassed or anxious citizens will pay to have their
images taken down. It isn’t hard to imagine that the next generation of this
business will cast a wider net, capitalizing on stockpiles of aggregated and
filtered data derived from diverse public disclosures. Besides presenting new,
unsettling detail about behavior and proclivities, they might even display predictive inferences couched within litigation-buttressing weasel wording—e.g.,
“correlations between X and Y have been known to indicate Z.” Everyone,
then, will be at greater risk of unintentionally leaking sensitive personal details.
Everyone will be more susceptible to providing information that gets taken out
of its original context, becomes integrated into a new profile, and subsequently
harms a friend, family member, or colleague.
Inevitably, those extracting personal details from big data will argue that
the information was always apparent and the law should not protect information that exists in plain sight.7 The law has struggled with protecting privacy
in public long before big data. However, we envision a tipping point occurring
whereby some pro-publicity precedent appears more old than wise.
II. MORE DATA, LESS OBSCURITY
Socialization and related daily public disclosures have always been protected by varying layers of obscurity, a concept that we previously defined as
follows:
Obscurity is the idea that when information is hard to obtain or understand, it is, to some degree, safe. Safety, here, doesn’t mean inaccessible.
Competent and determined data hunters armed with the right tools can always
find a way to get it. Less committed folks, however, experience great effort as
a deterrent.
Online, obscurity is created through a combination of factors. Being
invisible to search engines increases obscurity. So does using privacy settings

6. Although we’re focusing on how the law should respond to the dark side of big
data, some see mastering quantitative legal prediction as essential to the future of entrepreneurial law firms and the law schools that train students to work in them. See, e.g., Daniel
Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start
Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909
(2013).
7. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 29 (describing one instance
of information discovered from big data analysis as “always apparent [as] [i]t existed in plain
sight”).
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and pseudonyms. Disclosing information in coded ways that only a limited
audience will grasp enhances obscurity, too. Since few online disclosures are
truly confidential or highly publicized, the lion’s share of communication on
the social web falls along the expansive continuum of obscurity: a range that
runs from completely hidden to totally obvious.8

In the past, individuals have been able to roughly gauge whether aspects of
their daily routines and personal disclosures of information would be safeguarded at any appropriate level of privacy protection by (sometimes
implicitly) guessing the likelihood their information would be discovered or
understood by third parties who have exploitative or undesirable interests. In
the age of big data, however, the confidence level associated with privacy
prognostication has decreased considerably, even when conscientious people
exhibit due diligence.
Increasingly powerful and often secretive (proprietary and governmental)
algorithms combined with numerous and massive datasets are eroding the
structural and contextual protections that imposed high transactional costs on
finding, understanding, and aggregating that information. Consumers got a taste
of both the ease and power in which these processes can occur when Facebook
rolled out Graph Search, denied it had privacy implications, then also revealed
how readily what we “like” gets translated into who we are.
Maintaining obscurity will be even more difficult once big data tools, techniques, and datasets become further democratized and made available to the
non-data-scientist masses for free or at low cost. Given recent technological
trends, this outcome seems to be gradually approaching inevitability. At the
touch of a button, Google’s search engine can already unearth an immense
amount of information that not too long ago took considerable effort to locate.
Looking ahead, companies like Intel are not shy about letting the public know
they believe “data democratization is a good bet.”9
Decreasing confidence in our ability to judge the privacy value of disclosures puts us on a collision course for deepening the problem of “bounded
rationality” and, relatedly, what Daniel Solove recognized as the problems of

8. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way to Think About Your
Data than ‘Privacy,’ ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283 (explaining how obscurity is the proper conceptual framework for analyzing the privacy implications that follow from the introduction of Graph to Facebook’s interface and analytics);
see also Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (2013) (identifying four key factors that define an obscurity continuum); Woodrow
Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385 (2013) (explaining how obscurity considerations can enhance privacy by design efforts); Fred Stutzman &
Woodrow Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social Media, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM
2012 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 769 (2012), available at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id= 2145320&bnc=1 (observing that the creation of obscurity
is part of the boundary regulation process of social media users).
9. See Jordan Novet, Why Intel Thinks Data Democratization is a Good Bet,
GIGAOM
(May
30,
2013),
http://gigaom.com/2013/05/30/why-intel-thinks-datademocratization-is-a-good-bet.
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scale, aggregation, and assessing harm.10 It appears that the courts will need to
grapple with a new wave of allegations of harms arising from behavior that
yielded unintended and unforeseeable consequences.
As a thought experiment that crystalizes our guiding intuitions, consider a
big data update to the problems that occurred when college students were
revealed to be gay to their disapproving parents after a third party added them
as members to Facebook’s Queer Chorus group.11 In the original instance, the
salient tension was between how Facebook described its privacy settings and
what users expected when utilizing the service. But what if someday a parent,
teacher, or other authority figure wanted to take active steps to determine if
their child, student, or employee was gay? Using democratized big data, a
range of individually trivial, but collectively potent, information could be canvassed. Geolocation data conveyed when the child, or, crucially, his or her
friends, used services like Foursquare combined with increasingly sophisticated
analytical tools could lead to a quick transition from checking in to being outed.
People-search services like Spokeo are well positioned to offer such userfriendly big data services.
III. THE COMMON LAW PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF
BIG DATA FOR EVERYONE
Once big data is democratized and obscurity protections are further
minimized, peer-to-peer interactions are poised to challenge many traditional
common law concepts. Because the courts already make inconsistent rulings on
matters pertaining to what reasonable expectations of privacy are, tort law is
especially vulnerable.12
Here are a few of the fundamental questions we expect the courts will
struggle to answer:
What Constitutes a Privacy Interest? A crucial question for both the tort of
public disclosure of private facts and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion is
whether the plaintiff had a privacy interest in a certain piece of information or

10. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1888-93 (2013) (“The point is that it is virtually impossible for
a person to make meaningful judgments about the costs and benefits of revealing certain data.”); see, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: A Survey, in
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 15, 16
(Katherine R. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information
Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1661 (1999) (“The difficulty with privacy-control in the Information Age is that individual self-determination is itself shaped by the processing of personal data.”).
11. Geoffrey A. Fowler, When the Most Personal Secrets Get Outed
on Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390444165804578008740578200224.html.
12. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 921.
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context. This determination has varied wildly among the courts, and it is
unclear how ubiquitous big data will alter this. For example, some courts have
found that a privacy interest exists in involuntary exposure in public.13 Other
courts have found that overzealous surveillance in public that reveals confidential data can be seen to violate a privacy interest.14 Will invasive “dataveillance” trigger the same protections?15 Finally, courts have found, albeit
inconsistently, a privacy interest in information known only to, and likely to
stay within, a certain social group.16 Does an increased likelihood that such
information might be ascertained by outsiders destroy the privacy interest in
information shared discreetly in small groups?17
What Actions Are Highly Offensive? Directly revealing or gaining access to
certain kinds of information has been found to be highly offensive for purposes
of the disclosure, intrusion, and false light torts.18 In an age of predictions based
upon data, would indirect disclosures of private information also be considered
highly offensive? If not, does the law need to better articulate these limits?
Does it matter if the eventual revelation of certain kinds of information that is
highly offensive was predictable? Regarding the intrusion tort, can information
gleaned from “public” big datasets ever be considered “secluded” and, if so,

13. See, e.g., Daily Time Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964).
14. See, e.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (“[I]t is

manifest that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a public place does not amount to an
invasion of his privacy. But, under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable . . . . A person does not automatically make public everything
he does merely by being in a public place.”); Kramer v. Downey, 680 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex.
App. 1984).
15. See Roger Clarke, ROGER CLARKE’S DATAVEILLANCE AND INFORMATION PRIVACY
HOME-PAGE, http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV (last updated Jan. 6, 2013) (defining dataveillance as “the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of
the actions or communications of one or more persons”); see also Jerry Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1261 (1998) (arguing that “information collection in cyberspace is more like surveillance than like casual observation”);
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1417 (2001) (“Dataveillance is thus a new form of surveillance, a method of watching not through the eye or the camera, but by collecting facts and
data.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 761 (2008) (observing that “[j]ust as “dataveillance” can chill an individual’s experimentation with particular
ideas or pastimes, relational surveillance can chill tentative associations and experimentation
with various group identities”).
16. See, e.g., Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
17. See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 922.
18. See, e.g., Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963)
(identity of a rape victim); Crippen v. Charter Southland Hosp. Inc., 534 So. 2d 286 (Ala.
1988) (confidential medical data); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984 (Idaho 1974) (nude
photos); Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927) (debts); Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d
333 (Wash. 1998) (autopsy photos).
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would using tools to unearth such data ever be considered highly offensive to a
reasonable person?19
What Kinds of Disclosures Breach a Confidence? When has a confidant
disclosed enough indirect information effectively to breach a confidence? If
revealing a friend’s location more than once a week allows others to determine
that he is visiting a doctor for treatment of a communicable disease—a secret
you promised to keep confidential—have you breached your promise? Courts
would likely be hesitant to find a breach if the link between the disclosure and
revealed confidential information were speculative, though inevitably some
indirect disclosures will be so likely to compromise the confidentiality of other
pieces of information so as to result in a de facto disclosure of the information
itself. Should contracts with privacy-protective terms between individuals and
small groups contemplate potential uses in big data? What lengths must confidants go to protect facts from being uncovered via big data techniques?
IV. REGULATING THE BIG IMPACT OF SMALL DECISIONS
Given the powerful debate over large-scale regulation of big data, safeguarding smaller, peer-to-peer interaction may prove to be the most feasible
and significant privacy-related protection against big data.20 The concept of

19. See Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 3, at 1827 (“[P]laintiffs
probably cannot sue database operators for intrusion on seclusion under current case law. To
prevail in an intrusion suit, a plaintiff must show that a defendant invaded his physical solitude or seclusion, such as by entering his home, in a manner that would be highly offensive
to the reasonable person. Database operators and data brokers, however, never intrude upon
a plaintiff’s private space. They do not gather information directly from individuals and, to
the extent that they do, the privacy problem involves the failure to secure personal information, not its collection.”) (citations omitted). But see Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New
Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 207 (2012) (“Intrusion has great, untapped potential
to address privacy harms created by advances in information technology. Though the tort is
associated with conduct in real space, its principles apply just as well to operations in the era
of Big Data.”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering
and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 227 (1998) (“[S]everal recent
examples indicate that the average citizen’s privacy is protected from media intrusions primarily by media disinterest, a tenuous basis at best for privacy protection.”); McClurg, supra
note 3, at 1057 (“The tort of intrusion can be redefined in a way that would allow recovery in
suitable cases of public intrusion while also accommodating the competing interests of free
social interaction and free speech.”); Richards, supra note 3, at 383 (“[I]f we are interested in
protecting against what we colloquially call ‘invasions of privacy,’ the intrusion model is a
better fit with our intuitive linguistic understandings of that metaphor.”).
20. For a skeptical view on the likelihood of significant regulation limiting how businesses mine data, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126
HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2033 (2013) (“The deck is stacked against restrictions on data mining.”). Cf. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 10, at 296 (asserting that, as a private
law response to privacy harms, “[t]he contours of a negligence regime are simply too uncertain, and inherent problems with its enforcement undermines optimal deterrence,” and proposing a strict-liability response instead); Sarah Ludington, Reigning in the Data Traders: A
Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 146 (2006) (proposing a
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obscurity might be useful in guiding the common law’s evolution. If embraced
as part of the disclosure and intrusion privacy torts, obscurity would allow
socially shared information to fall within the ambit of “private facts” and
“secluded” contexts. Contracts could also be used to protect the obscurity of
individuals by targeting big data analysis designed to reveal socially shared but
largely hidden information. Those charged with interpreting broad privacyrelated terms should keep in mind structural and contextual protections that
might have been relied upon by those whose privacy was to be protected.
Those forming the common law can now choose one of two paths. They
can cling to increasingly ineffective and strained doctrines that were created
when structural and contextual protections were sufficient for most of our
socialization and obscure activities in public. Or they can recognize the debilitating effect big data has on an individual’s ability to gauge whether social disclosures and public activity will later harm themselves and others, and evolve
the common law to keep small acts of socialization and our day-to-day activities from becoming big problems.

tort to target “insecure data practices” and “the use of personal information data for purposes
extraneous to the original transaction”).

